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Abstract
Recently, many AI researchers and practitioners have
embarked on research visions that involve doing AI
for “Good”. This is part of a general drive towards
infusing AI research and practice with ethical think-
ing. One frequent theme in current ethical guidelines
is the requirement that AI be good for all, or: con-
tribute to the Common Good. But what is the Com-
mon Good, and is it enough to want to be good? Via
four lead questions, I will illustrate challenges and
pitfalls when determining, from an AI point of view,
what the Common Good is and how it can be en-
hanced by AI. The questions are: What is the prob-
lem / What is a problem?, Who defines the prob-
lem?, What is the role of knowledge?, and What are
important side effects and dynamics? The illustra-
tion will use an example from the domain of “AI for
Social Good”, more specifically “Data Science for So-
cial Good”. Even if the importance of these ques-
tions may be known at an abstract level, they do not
get asked sufficiently in practice, as shown by an ex-
ploratory study of 99 contributions to recent confer-
ences in the field. Turning these challenges and pit-
falls into a positive recommendation, as a conclusion
I will draw on another characteristic of computer-
science thinking and practice to make these imped-
iments visible and attenuate them: “attacks” as a
method for improving design. This results in the pro-
posal of ethics pen-testing as a method for helping AI
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designs to better contribute to the Common Good.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, machine learning,
data science, AI ethics, ethics and ethics codes, risks
and impacts, Common Good, AI for Social Good
1 Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is currently experiencing
another “summer” in terms of perceived promises
and economic growth. At the same time, there are
widespread debates around AI’s perceived risks and
negative impacts. In response to the latter, AI re-
searchers and practitioners are paying increasing at-
tention to existing ethics codes, and they are draft-
ing new ones. In addition, many have embarked on
research programs that explore how to do AI “for
Good”. These two reactions are linked, at a high
level, by the understanding that the goal of ethics
codes is to encourage and ensure “ethical” profes-
sional conduct in the sense of this conduct being
“morally good or correct” and “avoiding activities
[...] that do harm to people or the environment”.1 2
In addition to the goal to do “good”, many current
ethics codes and discussions go further and require
that AI contribute to the Common Good. This term
is not uniquely (and in many publications not at all)
defined, but can be understood as the aim to be good
for all.
The purpose of the current article is to investi-
gate more closely the notion of AI for the Common
Good by drawing on a wider literature, and to start
a deeper discussion in the AI community about this
1
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goal and the way towards it. Towards this purpose, I
invite researchers and practitioners to ask four reflec-
tive questions of their research practices and projects.
These questions can be used as provocations: inter-
ruptions of the flow of everyday practices designed
to “initiate critical reflection [...] on issues that are
often otherwise overlooked, obscured or accepted as
naturalised practice” [1, p. 225], see [2] for the use of
provocations to encourage reflection on big data.
The article is structured as follows.
The Common Good is a notion predating AI. I will
start from the definitions given in various AI ethics
codes of the Common Good and related notions, and
draw on selected discussions in political philosophy
for deriving questions about these definitions and
their operationalization for AI. These definitions and
questions are the subject of Section 2.
Section 3 will provide definitions of other key terms
used in the article, including AI, data science, and
knowledge. The very general term “AI” will be used
to denote research and projects that involve the pro-
cessing and analysis of knowledge and data, often
with machine learning / data mining methods. This
interpretation corresponds to the strong representa-
tion of data science projects at least in the “AI for
Social Good” literature, see Section 5.2. Specific ref-
erences to data science and machine learning / data
mining will be made when necessary.
Contributing to the Common Good is an ambitious
and noble aim, and I am convinced that it inspires
many researchers and practitioners to act in responsi-
ble ways. However, as I will argue in this paper, even
with the best of intentions, certain characteristics of
AI thinking and practice, coupled with the inherent
need to act in politically charged environments, may
impede ‘design for the Common Good’. To explain
why, Section 4 will detail four specific characteristics,
summarized into four lead questions: the problem-
solving and solutionism mindset of the engineer, the
difficulties of integrating different stakeholders, the
role of knowledge, and side effects and dynamics.
Section 5 will validate the importance of the four
lead questions via an exploratory survey of 99 contri-
butions to recent conferences on AI and Data Science
“for Social Good” or “for Good”, the notions that are
currently most similar to AI for the Common Good
and that are sufficiently established to have formed
conferences.
Turning these challenges into a positive recommen-
dation, the concluding Section 6 will draw on another
characteristic of computer-science thinking and prac-
tice to make the impediments visible and attenuate
them: “attacks” as a method for improving design.
In analogy with penetration attacks, I will propose
ethics pen-testing as a method for helping AI designs
to better contribute to the Common Good. Further,
I will argue why the arguments put forward here are
characteristic of and relevant for AI and for the goal
of enhancing the Common Good, but not restricted
to the field or the goal.
2 What is the Common Good?
2.1 The Common Good as a goal for
AI
The ambition to be good for all (or at least many)
people has become prominent throughout computer
science in general and AI in particular. Some exam-
ples can be found in ethics codes:
• ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct
[3]: “1.1 Contribute to society and human well-
being. This principle concerning the quality of
life of all people affirms an obligation to protect
fundamental human rights and to respect the di-
versity of all cultures.”
• Asilomar Principles [4]:
“23) Common Good: Superintelligence should
only be developed in the service of widely
shared ethical ideals, and for the benefit of
all humanity rather than one state or orga-
nization.”
“14) Shared Benefit: AI technologies should
benefit and empower as many people as
possible.”
“15) Shared Prosperity: The economic prosper-
ity created by AI should be shared broadly,
to benefit all of humanity.”
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• Similar ideas are implicit in IEEE Ethically
Aligned Design [5, p. 5]: the goal to “de-
velop successful autonomous intelligent systems
that will benefit society” and the second General
Principle, to “Prioritize the maximum benefit to
humanity and the natural environment.”
The first thing to note in these different principles
is how differently collectives are referred to. They
range from ‘not all of the benefits should accrue to
giant internet companies’ (“rather than one state or
organization”) to literally “all people” or “all human-
ity”. “As many people as possible” lies between these
extremes, but is underspecified when one does not
know what constitutes the possible. Further under-
specified terms are the “broadly shared prosperity”
and the “widely shared ethical ideals” (see Section 3
for possible referents). The wordings also leave room
for different distributions of the benefits, and they
make no statements about how to negotiate multiple
and possibly conflicting ideals, values, and notions
of what is good. Many of these questions have been
and are being debated in the wider literature on the
Common Good, which is the subject of the following
section.
2.2 Some questions regarding the
Common Good, inspired by the
notion from political philosophy
The Common Good has been discussed widely and
controversially by many authors in political philoso-
phy, and it is impossible to survey this literature in
the scope of this article.3 Instead, I will very briefly
present some issues that raise relevant questions for
the interpretation of the concepts proposed in AI.
The Common Good has been defined as “that
which benefits society as a whole” [6]. But how are
these elements (the “that”, “benefit”, “society”) de-
fined?
Hussain [7] gives more details about the that: “the
common good is [. . . ] part of an encompassing model
for practical reasoning among the members of a polit-
ical community. [. . . ] The relevant [interests and fa-
cilities that serve these interests] together constitute
the common good and serve as a shared standpoint
for political deliberation. [. . . ] The relevant facil-
ities may be part of the natural environment (e.g.,
the atmosphere, a freshwater aquifer, etc.) or hu-
man artifact (e.g., hospitals, schools, etc.). But the
most important facilities [. . . ] are social institutions
and practices.” One example of such institutions and
practices is a scheme of private property. Funda-
mental rights / human rights (“basic rights and free-
doms”) are parts of the Common Good [7]. Finally,
I will use values interchangeably with “interests” for
the purposes of the present article.
The notion of benefit also invites different readings:
is it an individual’s or a group’s utility in a welfare
consequentialist sense, and/or is it based on values
beyond this? (Hussain [7] favors the latter reading,
but also reports on alternative conceptualizations of
the Common Good.) Finally, the questions of what
the boundaries of the relevant society (or: political
community and its members) are, and of whether to
take a welfare consequentialist or other standpoint,
and whether and how to account for collective above
individual interests [8], tend to receive less attention
than others in “for Good” initiatives, and will there-
fore not be considered further here.
But even the definitional elements of facilities, in-
terests, and practical reasoning raise further ques-
tions. The following is a selection that contributed
to the choice of lead questions proposed below.
A first questions is: Who defines the Common
Good (or the interests and facilities) and how? Po-
litical philosophy distinguishes between substantive
and proceduralist conceptions of the Common Good.
Substantive conceptions specify what factors, goods,
values, etc. are beneficial and shared. Procedural-
ist conceptions instead focus on what procedures are
adequate to collectively negotiate and define what is
beneficial.
The expression “substantive value” is intended to
denote the unassailable status of the value as some-
thing that can stand on its own and requires no justi-
fication. Yet that status is logically dependent on the
attribution of the speaker, who categorizes the value
as such. Any such self-supporting value is easily chal-
lenged by denying the attribution. Substantive values
and their attribution have come under specific po-
litical and philosophical attacks after the atrocities
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of 20th century authoritarian regimes, who all pro-
fessed to act in the interest of some common good,
an “attempt to make heaven on earth” that “invari-
ably produces hell.” [9]
Proceduralist notions of the Common Good rely
on democratic structures and deliberation; it need
not be known a priori which facilities and interests
will be agreed upon through these processes, see [10].
Even if the focus of proceduralist notions is on pro-
cess, this does not mean that there are no substantive
elements, e.g. [8]. The need for substantive elements
can arise from what Popper called the tolerance para-
dox (if a society is tolerant without limit, this toler-
ance can be abused or even destroyed by the intol-
erant). Countermeasures include constraints on the
forms the deliberation can take (e.g., that citizens
recognize each other as equal and use only reasons
that can be accepted by all others [11]) and legal con-
structs that enable and require a country’s political
bodies to protect the political order against those who
want to abolish them, such as constitutional clauses
that cannot be abolished even by a majority (“mili-
tant democracy”, cf. [12]).
Another distinction is that between communal and
distributive conceptions of the Common Good. A
communal conception takes the Common Good in-
terests to be interests that citizens have as citizens,
whereas a distributive conception is based on the ac-
knowledgement that citizens belong to various groups
with distinct interests, that these interests compete
for the facilities and resources and may pose different
demands, and decisions and allocations need to be
made according to some distributive principle [7].
2.2.1 From questions about the Common
Good to questions about AI for the
Common Good
The philosophical considerations about the Common
Good that have been summarized very briefly in the
previous section served as starting points for the
questions proposed in Section 4. Here, I will give
an overview of the link between the considerations
and questions.
The considerations above indicate that purely sub-
stantive accounts of the Common Good are problem-
atic, that procedures are important, and that groups
with different interests and demands may have dif-
ferent notions of the Common Good. These groups
correspond to what computer science calls stakehold-
ers. These considerations were one inspiration for the
first two lead questions: What is the problem, and
who defines it (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2)? A second
inspiration was that these same two questions have
proved constructive in interdisciplinary collaboration
around a specific Common Good interest and facility:
“privacy” [13].
Note that the definitional duality of “Good” and
“problem” introduced in the previous paragraph is
frequent in AI: some value or aspect of the Common
Good is missing, deficient, or under attack, and this
constitutes a problem. The problem then prompts
a search for a technological contribution to solving
or at least addressing this problem. The focus on a
(usually technological) solution is the reason to ask a
modified version of the first lead question: What is a
problem in the first place (see Section 4.3)?
“AI for the Common Good” is understood here
(and in the surveyed literature) in an engineering
sense. Thus, AI methods, technology, and their de-
ployment cannot be an interest, but a facility (or part
of it) that serves an interest. This raises the ques-
tion: what kind of facility is or should this be? I
will argue that today, this is mostly some form of
knowledge that is then fed into further decision pro-
cesses. (Another candidate are autonomous systems,
which would require a different analysis.) This in-
spired the third lead question concerning what the
role of knowledge is (see Section 4.4).
The fourth lead question asks about important side
effects and dynamics (see Section 4.5). This can be
related to the Common Good literature in that this
literature also investigates what is likely to happen
under different structures of people acting, deliberat-
ing, deciding, and collaborating.
2.3 AI and Data Science for (Social)
Good
At this point in the argument, one would normally in-
vestigate how concrete projects or initiatives (rather
than abstract ethics codes) define the Common Good.
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However, the call to develop and deploy AI for the
Common Good has, to the best of my knowledge,
not yet led to research programs or publications un-
der that name. At the time of writing of this article
(August 2018), a Google search returned three texts.
The phrasing “AI for Common Good” has been used
in the titles of two recent white papers, one prepared
for attendees of the 2018 World Economic Forum An-
nual Meeting [14], and one by North Highland Con-
sulting [15]. Both focus on highlighting threats posed
by Artificial Intelligence; what the Common Good is
and how to use AI towards it is not explicated. In ad-
dition, an entry in the Communications of the ACM’s
news, titled “AI for the Common Good” [16], reports
on the AI for Good Global Summit, whose goal defi-
nition is given below.
However, related ideas have a longer tradition and
have led to several conferences and research pro-
grams. To outline the field, I have selected four that
I believe are most influential and representative of
“AI for (some version of) Good”. The selection was
based on the duration of the initiative (at least two
editions) and/or the backing by an important pro-
fessional association (AAAI) or an important inter-
national actor (the UN). Since the initiatives present
their definitions on their Web pages rather than in
scientific publications, some interpretation is needed
and will be supplied in the following paragraphs.
Initiatives around AI and Data Science will be pre-
sented, for several reasons. First, “for Social Good”
originated as an initiative from data science, second,
data science is one key area of, or related to, current
AI (for details, see the definitions in Section 3), such
that, third, many contributions to conferences on AI
for (Social) Good are or contain data science.
The Data Science for Social Good (DSSG) initia-
tive has organized, since 2013, an annual “summer
program for aspiring data scientists to work on data
mining, machine learning, big data, and data science
projects with social impact. Working closely with
governments and nonprofits, fellows take on real-
world problems in education, health, energy, trans-
portation, and more.”4 The first part of this defini-
tion is strictly speaking not very specific, since many
uses of AI have social impact, including large social
networks, search engines, and (inter)national surveil-
lance programs. This shifts the definitional core of
“Social Good” to the domains of projects (such as
education, health, energy and transportation) and
to the actors (governments and nonprofits) who are
likely to be the ones to define project goals and/or
who control and provide the data.
A definition via domains and actors is also used
by the Data Science for Social Good (SoGood) work-
shop series that has so far seen three consecutive edi-
tions at ECML PKDD, a major conference on ma-
chine learning, data mining, and data science: “how
Data Science can and does contribute to social good
in its widest sense, including areas such as: Public
safety and disaster relief, Access to food, water, and
utilities, Efficiency and sustainability, Government
transparency, Data journalism, Economic develop-
ment, Education, Social services, Healthcare. We are
interested both in non-profit projects and in projects
that, that while not defined as non-profit, still have
Social Good as their main focus, and so have man-
aged to build a sustainable business model.”5
A focus on DSSG projects’ problem-solving is sug-
gested by [17]: DSSG consists of “attempts to solve
complex social problems through the use of increas-
ingly available, increasingly combinable, and increas-
ingly computable digital data”.
With a method scope of AI in general (rather than
DS in particular), the Association for the Advance-
ment of Artificial Intelligence held a spring sympo-
sium on “AI for the Social Good” in 2017.6 The
AAAI Spring Symposia center on emerging topics in
AI; hence, this is an indication of the endorsement of
the field, by a major professional association. “AI for
the Social Good” is defined as AI “addressing societal
challenges, which have not yet received significant at-
tention by the AI community or by the constellation
of AI sub-communities, [the use of] AI methods to
tackle unsolved societal challenges in a measurable
manner.”7 Another venue defines the field by declar-
ing “almost any real-world problem, which is impor-
tant for society’s benefit, and could potentially be
solved using AI techniques, [to be] within the ambit
of this symposium.”8 This definition reiterates the
idea of “benefit for society”, see Section 2.2, and the
focus on problem-solving.
With a method scope of “Good” in general (rather
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than “Social Good” in particular), the ITU, the
UN agency responsible for issues that concern infor-
mation and communication technologies, leads the
“AI for Global Good Summit”. The Summit has
so far been organized twice (2017 and 2018). The
goal is described as “AI innovation [being] central
to the achievement of the United Nations’ Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs) by capitalizing on
the unprecedented quantities of data now being gen-
erated on sentiment behavior, human health, com-
merce, communications, migration and more”, in-
cluding goals such as “no poverty”, “zero hunger”,
and “good health and well-being”.9 These and most
of the 14 other SDG goals have a substantive focus.
More specific societal goals, for example fairness
(non-discrimination), are pursued by research com-
munities such as Fairness, Accountability and Trans-
parency in Machine Learning and beyond.10 Another
example is the protection of privacy as the goal of var-
ious research communities including (in DS) privacy-
preserving data mining and data publishing. In ad-
dition, funding programs with similar goals exist. I
have been part of two “projects with a primary soci-
etal finality” funded by the Flemish Science Council
FWO. In these projects, multidisciplinary consortia
(of which AI was only one partner) investigated pri-
vacy in online social networks and diversity in media,
respectively. The methodological and ethical debates
in these projects have been an important source of
inspiration for the current article. Since these goals
are quite distinct from (or at least much more spe-
cific than) the Common Good, these specific notions
of the Good will not be investigated further here.
In sum, “the Common Good” is referred to as
a goal for AI in current publications, but not de-
fined. Concrete current initiatives refer to the “So-
cial Good” or simply “the good”, circumscribing
it via problem domains and the identity of the
non-academic project partners (nonprofits or govern-
ments), or via substantive goals agreed upon at UN
level. It appears that, as a common denominator,
the intended beneficiaries of AI for Good, for Social
Good, etc. will generally not be the ones who directly
pay for the development or use of this AI. Thus, un-
like for example in commercial application areas, no
market price can serve as indicator of value. “The
Social Good” is then the indicator of such value.
Healthcare is an interesting example: while it can
be a profit-oriented business model, the focus in the
domain of AI for (Social) Good appears to lie on the
provision of healthcare to broader sections of society
(see “for all” above). The historical experience sug-
gests that such a provision requires some kind of na-
tional insurance financing scheme based on solidarity
rather than payment-for-service. Thus, is any con-
tribution of AI to better healthcare methods already
“AI for Good”, or is more needed? It is likely that
such questions will be asked in the further develop-
ment of the field.
3 Terminology: AI, Data Sci-
ence, knowledge, and ethics-
in-AI
In this section, further key terms used in this article
will be defined.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is “the ability of a dig-
ital computer or computer-controlled robot to per-
form tasks commonly associated with intelligent be-
ings. The term is frequently applied to the project
of developing systems endowed with the intellec-
tual processes characteristic of humans, such as the
ability to reason, discover meaning, generalize, or
learn from past experience” [18]. In line with the
ACM Computer-Science subjects classification, I re-
gard AI as a subfield of computer science, and as
such a field at the intersection of science and engi-
neering. Machine Learning (involved in particular in
the last three characteristics of the preceding list) is
a field of AI, as encoded for example in the ACM
Computer-Science subjects classification in its most
recent (2012) version.11
Data Science (DS) is understood here as a subfield
of AI, or more specifically as a field that (a) is situ-
ated in many universities within AI groups and (b)
draws heavily on methods developed or used in ma-
chine learning and data mining. (The machine learn-
ing aspect corresponds to the focus on learning mod-
els of data, and the data mining aspect to the focus
on entire knowledge-discovery workflows.) More gen-
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erally, data science has been defined as “the science
(or study) of data” and “a new interdisciplinary field
that synthesizes and builds on statistics, informatics,
computing, communication, management, and soci-
ology to study data and its environments (including
domains and other contextual aspects, such as orga-
nizational and social aspects) in order to transform
data to insights and decisions by following a data-
to-knowledge-to-wisdom thinking and methodology”
[19]. Conway [20], in a frequently cited online source,
described data science by means of a Venn diagram:
with regard to machine learning, data science is situ-
ated in the intersection of machine learning and sub-
stantive expertise.
Knowledge is understood in two ways. On the one
hand, I will refer to a notion of knowledge as used in
psychology: “a structured collection of information
that can be acquired through learning, perception or
reasoning” [21], understood to be held by a human
agent (mental representation). It is the knowledge
about something in the world, the expertise [17] that
generally draws on many sources and fields, such as
different academic disciplines. Such human knowl-
edge can be both input to a research or development
activity, and its eventual result.
On the other hand, I will refer to knowledge as the
more immediate output of an AI or DS activity. Rus-
sel and Norvig [22, p. 16] implicitly define knowledge
as a structured collection of “information [...] put
into a form that a computer can reason with”. The
field of knowledge discovery from databases and the
related fields of data mining and data science focus
on knowledge in the sense of “novel, valid, poten-
tially useful, and ultimately understandable patterns
in data” [23] – where the intended recipient, who can
use and understand these patterns as structured rep-
resentations, is often but not necessarily human. In
all these meanings, knowledge is structured informa-
tion, useful and/or understandable to a person or ma-
chine.
In this article, the very general term “AI” will be
used to denote research and projects that involve the
processing and analysis of knowledge and data, often
with machine learning / data mining methods. This
interpretation corresponds to the strong representa-
tion of data science projects at least in the “AI for
Social Good” literature, see Section 5.2. Specific ref-
erences to data science and machine learning / data
mining will be made when necessary.
A final note concerns the question: Whose ethics?
Robotics as such is not in the focus of the present
article, but robots are relevant to the focus on AI and
ethics. Not all artificial intelligence is incorporated
into robotics, and not all robots are artificially intelli-
gent. However, the intersection is large and relevant,
and I regard such AI robots as typical representa-
tives of what the Asilomar Principles call “highly au-
tonomous AI systems”. Regarding these, three types
of ethics are relevant.
The first type is the professional ethics of the re-
searcher or practitioner (often referred to as com-
puter ethics). This is guided by principles such as the
Asilomar Principle 11) “Human Values: AI systems
should be designed and operated so as to be compat-
ible with ideals of human dignity, rights, freedoms,
and cultural diversity.” Arguably, these ideals are
widely shared, codified for example in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.12 Thus, one may in-
terpret the “widely shared ethical ideals” of Principle
23) as consisting of these four, and possibly also oth-
ers. (According to Principle 23), “[s]uperintelligence
should only be developed in the service of widely
shared ethical ideals and for the benefit of all hu-
manity rather than one state or organization.”)
The second type is the professional ethics of a re-
searcher or practitioner who develops robots. Fol-
lowing Veruggio [24], I refer to this as roboethics:
“Roboethics is not the ethics of robots nor any arti-
ficial ethics, but it is the human ethics of the robots’
designers, manufacturers, and users.” Asilomar Prin-
ciple 10) constrains these design, manufacturing and
use activities by positing “Value Alignment: Highly
autonomous AI systems should be designed so that
their goals and behaviors can be assured to align with
human values throughout their operation.”
Note that this formulation focuses on the goals and
behaviors of a robot and asks that these be aligned
with human values (presumably those of Principle 11)
listed above), and that it does not make a commit-
ment as to whether these goals and behaviors stem
from the humans designing, manufacturing, or using
the robot, or from the robot itself. Thus, the ques-
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tion of whether machine ethics [25, 26, 27] as a third
type of ethics, the ethics of a robot (or in fact any
AI system), exists and if so, what its properties are,
is left open. In line with this, the remainder of this
article will focus on computer ethics / roboethics as
human ethics in the sense described above.
4 How to create “AI for the
Common Good”: Four lead
questions
In this section, I will analyze four specific charac-
teristics of AI thinking and practice that challenge
and may impede design for the Common Good: the
problem-solving and solutionism mindset of the en-
gineer, the integration of stakeholders, the role of
knowledge, and side effects and dynamics.
The questions will be illustrated by references to
a running example from the domain of “AI for So-
cial Good”. The example itself is, intentionally, not
a real example in the sense of being the contents of a
specific AI paper, report or otherwise – because the
point of the present article is not to denigrate the
merits of any particular project. Instead, the exam-
ple is a fictitious synopsis of uses of AI/DS in various
contexts, with these uses all focusing on the same is-
sue. The example centers on drugs, considered by
some to be “public enemy number one”13, that is,
the ultimate “Common Bad”, whose absence would
surely enhance the Common Good. While tradition-
ally, such statements targeted illegal drugs, the recent
US opioid crisis, which was declared a Nationwide
Public Health Emergency14, has highlighted how a
similar problem can originate from a substance that
may be legally prescribed or illegally peddled. The
opioid crisis also illustrates how public health and
criminal justice issues continue to interact: Within
three paragraphs of one political speech, US Presi-
dent Trump lauded an initiative that caused people
to turn in more than 900,000 pounds of unused or
expired prescription drugs, and the arrest of criminal
aliens with 76,000 charges and convictions for dan-
gerous drug crimes.15
The rhetoric around the opioid crisis has brought
one question back into sharp focus: There is a prob-
lem, but what exactly is wrong? This leads to the
first lead question Q1.
4.1 Q1: “What is the problem?”
Consider the example: What is “the drug problem“?
Here is a non-exhaustive list of candidates:
1. People use drugs.
2. People sell drugs.
3. Certain people (e.g. the poor, black people, ...)
use drugs.
4. Drug users commit crimes.
5. Drug users become homeless, ill, ...
6. Drug users die (earlier than they would have
without drugs).
7. There aren’t enough drugs available.
These alternative definitions are designed to repre-
sent, in a simplified way, the views of different peo-
ple who are affected by drug usage and its conse-
quences.16 If, therefore, a system to “solve” the drug
problem, by AI or otherwise, is created, the question
of who defines the problem counts.
4.2 Q2: Who defines the problem?
A necessary condition for designing systems that fur-
ther the Common Good is to hear the voices of mul-
tiple and diverse people who will be affected by the
system. The integration of multiple stakeholders in
requirements engineering (for an overview, see [28])
are therefore increasingly required by ethics codes
as well as laws. Codes such as the ACM Code of
Conduct [3]17, the AOIR Recommendations for Eth-
ical Decision-Making and Internet Research [29]18,
and the IEEE Ethically Aligned Design guidelines
[5]19 explicitly call for this. A special form of multi-
stakeholder requirements elicitation has recently even
attained the status of a legal obligation: the Eu-
ropean Union’s new data protection law, the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), requires
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a data protection impact assessment before personal
data are collected and processed. (While the current
article focuses on ethics codes, I will make some ref-
erences to the GDPR as an example of a current and
wide-ranging attempt to codify rules for technology,
including AI, to protect individuals’ rights and free-
doms.)
As part of such processes, “[i]t is understood that
there will be clashes of values and norms when iden-
tifying, implementing, and evaluating these systems
(a state often referred to as ‘moral overload’)” [5, p.
23], so conflict resolution methods and processes are
required. The study of democratic methods for gath-
ering and negotiating requirements is a subfield of
requirements engineering [30]. However, an ongoing
challenge remains: how to best support democratic
deliberation and conceptions of distributive justice
with software and/or software engineering methods.
Conflict identification and resolution become more
difficult when stakeholders are differentially able to
cause a clash in the first place, because they are em-
bedded in socio-technical systems differently and dif-
fer in their abilities to perceive and voice their val-
ues and norms. As an example, consider imprisoned
drug users as one of the relevant groups in [31]. Fur-
ther problems arise when affected communities and
individuals are outside the boundaries of the society
deemed relevant in the respective notion of the Com-
mon Good. For example, inhabitants of countries
such as Colombia, in which drugs are grown and who
suffer from the local effects of drug cartels’ power,
have argued that they are outside the consideration
of drug consumers in the West [32].
In addition, it is questionable whether talking to
different stakeholders is enough, because it may not
affect the structural mold into which these different
stakeholders’ utterances will be put: the very notion
of what a problem – any problem – is. This will be
investigated next.
4.3 Q1’: “What is a problem?” (and
thereby: What is the problem –
revisited)
While conceivably no AI researcher or practitioner
would be as preposterous as claiming to “solve the
drug problem”, AI approaches do focus on a ver-
sion of the problem (usually implicitly specified to be
smaller). This is evidenced by the above-mentioned
reference to the use of AI on “[a]lmost any real-world
problem, which is important for society’s benefit,
and could potentially be solved using AI techniques”.
This is germane to the discipline and the “problem-
solving mindset” of the engineer.
4.3.1 Problem-solving
In everyday language, a problem is “a matter or situ-
ation regarded as unwelcome or harmful and needing
to be dealt with and overcome”.20 In some cases,
“dealing with and overcoming” may be relatively
straightforward. Using another drugs example: if the
problem is a person’s breathing being suspended due
to an overdose, this problem can be dealt with and
overcome by the proper administration of Naloxone.
However, most real-world problems, including many
around drug overdosing, are more complex. For ex-
ample, subjecting a heroin addict to a methadone
program can “deal with” the heroin addiction, but
it does not necessarily “overcome” it. In addition,
many real-world problems are open-ended. For ex-
ample, there is probably no “overcoming” the fact
that in any society, many people overuse or misuse
legal or illegal drugs – but this does not alleviate so-
cieties from the responsibility to “deal with” drug
usage.
On the other end of the scale, there are chess
problems: “an arrangement of pieces in which the
solver has to achieve a specified result” or mathe-
matics/physics problems: “an inquiry starting from
given conditions to investigate or demonstrate a fact,
result, or law.”
Engineering problems may, but do not have to,
start from the everyday notion — but the engineering
approach rests on transforming whatever the starting
point is into a well-defined designation: moving from
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a stateA (undesirable situation) to a stateB (desir-
able situation) [33]. Only once the “problem” has this
well-defined shape, can the engineer begin to “solve”
it. This is what makes engineering precise, graspable
and powerful.
However, most social problems are not chess prob-
lems, and they do not exist in context-free structures.
Therefore, en route to the definition of an engineer-
ing problem, one must usually make some assump-
tions that are hard or even impossible to formalize.
Ex post, the ambivalence that existed in the begin-
ning tends to be cognitively minimized and the result
is taken to be the truth (even if it did result from
decisions that might just as well have been made
otherwise), cf. [34]. The result is, partly, that the
definition of the problem often arose from the opin-
ions of only one or only a few stakeholders. Multi-
stakeholder methods and participatory software de-
sign are approaches for addressing this issue. How-
ever, regardless of which and how many stakeholders
have been consulted, formalization remains a neces-
sary step. The risk of conceiving of social problems
in terms of engineering problems is to blind oneself
to the vagaries of the formalization step, and to fail
to consider alternatives to the chosen formalization.
4.3.2 Problems and “solutions”
Likewise, what do we consider as “solutions”? This
will depend on the context in which problem-solving
takes place. Consider several standard problem-
solution pairs, with solution approaches from law, law
enforcement, and public health, in different countries.
The current discussion will focus on illegal drugs. In
general, problems 1-7 above exist for legal drugs too,
but are addressed differently.
In the War on Drugs that began in the Philippines
in 2016, attention has focused on the first and sec-
ond of the problem versions from Section 4.1 above
(henceforth, #1 and #2). The “solution” proposed in
the election campaign of President Duterte as well as
enacted in a large number of cases was to stifle both
supply and demand by killing drug dealers and drug
users, cf. [35]. Another “solution” approach consists
of criminalization and incarceration laws and policies
for drug dealing and use, even of small quantities, as
in the US during recent decades. Some countries ex-
empt the ownership and consumption of small quan-
tities of illegal drugs from prosecution (i.e. prioritize
#2 in the problem definition). Various societal actors
and authors (e.g. [36, 37]) have argued that problem
definition #3 stands behind US laws that penalize
the use and dealing of drugs traditionally associated
with poor and black users (crack cocaine) far heavier
than that of similar drugs traditionally more preva-
lent among affluent white users (powder cocaine).
The identity of drug users in problem definition #3
can even become associated with a (re-)framing both
of “the problem” and “the solution”. This point has
been made after US President Trump, in October
2017, declared the opioid crisis (which affects many
poor white people) a public health emergency rather
than another type of drugs on which to wage war [38].
#4 can be a problem in at least two ways: #4.1
when drug users commit crimes such as theft or pros-
titution to finance their addiction, or #4.2 when in-
toxicated people become uninhibited and/or aggres-
sive and then commit crimes such as assault and
murder. #4.2 is an often-voiced observation con-
cerning the legal drug alcohol, and “solutions” con-
tain penalties for driving when intoxicated. (Beyond
that, for legal drugs there tends to be a separation
between permitting the intoxication as an expres-
sion of personal freedoms, and the sanctioning of
crimes if they occur.) #4.1, on the other hand, is
in many cases tightly linked with #5, and programs
such as substituting methadone for heroin in (a) le-
gal, (b) insurance-covered, and (c) medically admin-
istered ways are offered as partial “solutions”. If #6
is considered the main problem, the question for a
solution may need to turn from the ubiquitous at-
tempts to reduce consumption to accepting the fact
that consumption and overdosing happen, and coun-
teract the lethal effects of overdoses as they appear.
These approaches from law, law enforcement and
healthcare are not, or not in their entirety, AI-based.
AI is used to address parts of the problems, as when
predictive policing software recommends where to pa-
trol for drugs [39]. The AI models underlying such
software need well-defined and accessible data and
well-defined objective functions whose maximization
constitutes a “solution”. This can lead to police de-
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ciding to patrol where there have been many drug-
related arrests in the past, rather than where there
has been much drug usage, and it will commit coun-
termeasures against such biased decisions to one for-
malization of “fairness”, which may mean that other
notions of fairness are violated [40, 41]. Such side-
effects of AI “solutions” should be kept in mind. To
keep the unavoidable restrictions more visible, ref-
erences to “problems” and “solutions” should be re-
placed by terms that are more clearly technical and
limited in scope, such as “the task to be done”. In
the example, the task could be to decide where to
patrol. Once the task is clear, the question becomes
what to do or communicate.
4.4 Q3: What is the role of knowl-
edge?
Above, I have argued that the transformation of a so-
cial problem into a formal problem poses challenges
when the goal is to contribute to the Common Good.
In this section, I will study two challenges related to
this transformation, both of them related to knowl-
edge. The first concerns the knowledge that enters
(or fails to enter) into the transformation into a for-
mal problem. The second concerns the reverse di-
rection: what happens when the output or “solu-
tion” of this formal problem is a piece of generated
knowledge? And what side-effects arise when both in-
put and output are (necessarily) entangled with the
knowledge of the AI developer, funder, ...? How may
AI methods themselves affect such knowledge effects?
What consequences may these constellations have on
the Common Good?
AI and in particular DS are strongly linked to
knowledge: The goal of AI is often described in a
procedure-oriented way, such as in the definition pre-
sented in Section 3: to “[develop] systems endowed
with the intellectual processes characteristic of hu-
mans, such as the ability to reason, discover mean-
ing, generalize, or learn from past experience”. Yet,
early on in the history of AI, it became clear that
only focusing on algorithms (e.g. for reasoning) will
not produce intelligence, but that strong knowledge
bases are also needed. Terminology and valuations of
logics-based approaches change over time, and cur-
rently, the reliance on knowledge is often expressed
as a reliance on (big) data instead. In other words,
AI systems and their outputs are considered useful if
they work on large and rich data or knowledge, and if
their outputs present new information that humans
derive further knowledge from and act upon.21
4.4.1 The power of knowledge: AI and fram-
ing effects
The framing of a problem denotes the way it is de-
scribed. The framing of a problem (and its associ-
ated “solutions”) has a powerful effect on how peo-
ple – and thus the public as those who may bene-
fit, or be harmed by an AI system – perceive the
world and act in it, e.g., [42]. Frames can them-
selves be objects of knowledge, that is, statements
can be made about them and discussed. For exam-
ple, different frames can be identified and compared
as alternatives. Designers should be aware that their
knowledge-based methods operate in an environment
filled with politically and otherwise induced frames
and that association-based methods tend to reinforce
these frames. These frames come loaded with certain
versions of the notion of the Common Good (and
many more blind spots regarding it). To work in the
interest of the Common Good, an AI researcher or
practitioner should be aware of this fact and make
conscious (and transparent) choices about whether
to sustain frames or expose them.
Framing interacts with AI for the Common Good
on multiple levels. First, frames contribute – or could
contribute – to problem definition. Second, AI, by
the way it processes knowledge, can serve to reinforce
such frames. Third, frames operate not only on the
level of problems and solutions, but also on the level
of methods. These effects will be considered in turn.
Frames emphasize certain aspects of reality, and
they suppress or even block others. One consequence
is that specific views – including but not limited to
the perception of what the problem is by specific
stakeholder groups – can remain suppressed, or that
the knowledge that certain solutions do not work is
blocked.
An example is the trope of the “War on Drugs”.
Launched in 1969 by then-US president Richard
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Nixon, this may have been influenced by concerns
over public health and the suffering induced by
abuses of illegal drugs. However, an alternative
view has co-existed with this, succinctly described
by Nixon’s then counsel and Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Domestic Affairs: “The Nixon campaign in
1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had
two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. [...]
We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either
against the war or black, but by getting the public
to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks
with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we
could disrupt those communities. We could arrest
their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meet-
ings, and vilify them night after night on the evening
news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs?
Of course we did.” [43]22. Baum’s view changes the
roles of pieces of knowledge: In the War on Drugs
frame, the drug-taking is the problem, and the solu-
tion is (or at least involves) arresting people, raiding
their homes, breaking up their meetings, and using
the media to vilify them. In the Baum frame, the
existence or growing influence or expectedly growing
influence of antiwar and black citizens is the problem,
and an (at least intermediate) solution is to wage a
War on Drugs. Independently of whether one follows
Baum’s sinister interpretation of the political will of
the Nixon campaign, there is now a more widespread
acceptance of criminalization and incarceration not
having “solved” anything at all [43]: (a) legal al-
ternatives to criminalization exist, have been or are
being tested in different countries, and have often
led to measurable improvements in health and crime
statistics, (b) legal drugs (in particular alcohol) and
prescription drugs (such as opioid painkillers) affect
far more people than illegal drugs and cause enor-
mous human suffering and economic costs, and (c)
the “cure” of criminalization imparts suffering and
creates new problems, also for the Common Good.
Frames tend to be reiterated and “echoed”, and
they can survive even in the face of clear scientific
evidence that contradicts a frame. Arguably, much
of current drug policy rests on reiterated, “echoed”
frames that have been constructed and perpetuated
for a number of decades now. One example is the
perpetuation of the focus on criminal justice even in
the context of the National Public Health Emergency
proclaimed by US President Trump, see above. An-
other example is the controversy around David Nutt’s
two studies in The Lancet arguing that alcohol and
tobacco are far more dangerous than common illegal
drugs. Among other things, Nutt was dismissed from
the UK government Advisory Council on the Misuse
of Drugs, see the summary and links in [44].
Mass media have long been known to be influen-
tial in relaying, reinforcing and maintaining frames
[45], creating “echo chambers”. Social media have
recently been described as intensifying the echo-
chamber effects that media often have anyway, e.g.
[46, 47, 48]. This is where AI enters: recommender
systems (the backbone of modern social media plat-
forms’ approach to addressing information overload)
work on associations learned from past data and
thereby tend to further strengthen these effects, e.g.
[49].
Framing operates not only at the level of problems
and solutions, but also on the method level. This can
have wide-ranging effects on decisions for example in
data-science related projects. For example, structur-
ing a decision-making process and tool by first iden-
tifying potential harms at a general level and then
weighing them against specific and contextual poten-
tial benefits “would always, it seemed, come out in
favour of intervening and therefore in favor of the
data sharing that would enable intervention” [50, pp.
4-5]. In an analysis of big data approaches to epi-
demics in high-income vs. low-/middle-income coun-
tries, the conception of populations as well-informed
individuals versus as pathogen-carrying groups may
imply that “big data models built to facilitate in-
dividuals’ well-being and autonomy instead would
constitute perfect tools for mass control and surveil-
lance” [51, p. 30]. Finally, the correlation-based na-
ture of data mining itself has effects. Data science
models used in the criminal justice sector have been
criticized widely for their effects of reproducing so-
cietal biases against minorities, cf. the proceedings
of the FAT(ML) conferences as a specific branch of
AI for Social Good, see Section 2.3. As Barabas et
al. [52] point out, there are however risks for all,
regardless of minority status, when the underlying
epistemic assumption is that persons “have” crimi-
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nal tendencies innately correlated to their features
and the intervention focusses on decisions about bail
or incarceration, rather than on causal factors and
the possibility to change them via effective diagnosis
and intervention of criminogenic needs.
In sum, frames affect AI projects, and they can
be reinforced by AI techniques. Framing may be un-
avoidable, but it needs to be reflected and – if ap-
propriate – counteracted. Methods such as those de-
signed to detect frames and bias, and to increase di-
versity in recommendation [53], can be components
of a more critical stance towards these mechanisms.
4.4.2 Limits of imparting knowledge: does it
work?
Given the strong effect of framing, someone who ig-
nores frames and believes that they can immediately
discern “the facts” in information they consume, or
can immediately convey “the facts” in information
they produce and communicate, underrates knowl-
edge. At the same time, many presentations of AI
tend to overrate knowledge in the sense that they
suggest that the existence of knowledge can by itself
solve problems.
Such overrating can occur when knowledge is im-
parted for awareness raising. This is the goal of
awareness tools in general (see [54] for an overview
specifically with regard to privacy awareness tools)
and today is found in many quantified-self apps. Ba-
sically, everybody (including drug users) knows that
drugs are bad for health, family life, socio-economic
status, etc. – but this does not stop an addict from
consuming the drug when the opportunity arises.
In general, the limitations of “just informing” have
been studied intensively in recent years by, for exam-
ple, behavioral economists, and alternatives such as
“nudging” have been investigated. These approaches
rest on acknowledging that “knowledge is not all” and
that decision-making is influenced by a wider range
of factors than just classical rationality. One im-
portant group of factors are social influences. Many
quantified-self apps and related applications, includ-
ing those around substance abuse or addiction prob-
lems23, try not only or not at all to impart knowledge,
but rather to help build and maintain social-support
groups.
In their focus on using IT as communication tech-
nology, many of these apps are not AI-based. So
where does AI come in? A very good example is Bird
et al.’s [31] use of data science methods informed by
definition #6 of “the drug problem”. The authors
used a data-science analysis to show the prevalence of
lethal overdoses among addicts recently released from
prison (at which time addicts are even more vulner-
able than usual due to the enforced abstinence while
in prison), and then instead of arguing for an aware-
ness campaign “to avoid drugs” or “avoid overdos-
ing”, handed out emergency overdose kits and gave
basic information on how to administer the antidote.
They showed, again with methods from data science,
the effectiveness of their intervention: the number of
deaths decreased significantly.
All these “solutions” rely on certain definitions or
framings of problem and solution, and all of them de-
pend on various factors determining decision making.
Data scientists and AI designers can draw on meth-
ods for supporting these factors and decisions studied
in human-computer interaction [55], but as the Bird
et al. example suggests, they should also be ready
to think outside the box and embrace solutions in
which they may only shine as diligent data analysts
in the background, rather than as providers of smart
knowledge-based tools in the foreground.
But even when imparting knowledge works, is it
always a good thing?
4.4.3 Limits of imparting knowledge: is it
good?
AI and in particular DS often appear to operate on
the assumption “The more knowledge, the better“.
This idea is applied to individuals as potential holders
of knowledge, and it also impinges on the idea of the
Common Good: “The more knowledge society has,
the better”. But is this always the case?
At the individual level, there are certain well-
known problems. First and as argued in the previous
section, imparting knowledge may not work in the
envisaged way. It may also manipulate people and
negatively impact their autonomy, or hurt them in
other ways [13]. It may place undue burden on them
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by making them responsible for tasks they lack the
mental, financial, temporal, etc. capabilities for (“re-
sponsibilization”, [56]). A growing number of legal
and ethics guidelines recognize such limits. These in-
clude culturally-grounded restrictions on imparting
knowledge [57] as well as “the right to not know” in
bioethics. Not knowing certain things is also recog-
nized as a helper against unconscious biases, and it
can therefore have economic advantages. The prop-
erties of such forms and conventions of not-knowing
are investigated in the field of ignorance studies [58].
If imparting knowledge is not necessarily beneficial,
a parsimony principle can be useful: focus on the task
at hand and get and use the knowledge needed for it,
but not more. This principle is inspired by ethical,
legal, and general intellectual principles. The Nurem-
berg Code, an early and highly influential code of re-
search ethics, posits: “The experiment should aim
at positive results for society that cannot be pro-
cured in some other way.”24 The legal principle of
proportionality (which pervades laws in general, and
is particularly clearly adaptable to current purposes
when a knowledge-based activity interferes with the
fundamental right to data protection) says that the
measure should be necessary to reach the goal. Sim-
ilarly, in data protection principles and laws such as
the GDPR, data minimization (collecting and using
as little personal data as possible for the task at hand)
is a guiding principle. Finally, arguably minimalism
is considered a scientific virtue, expressed by general
principles such as Occam’s razor down to specific top-
ics such as zero-knowledge proofs.
4.5 Q4: What are important side ef-
fects and dynamics?
Although computer science arose from cybernetics,
the study of systems and feedback loops, much of
today’s computer science rests on surprisingly lin-
ear and short-term cause-effect relationships. This
is probably due to that other basic principle of the
natural and engineering sciences: divide and conquer,
that is, split problems into parts and address these
separately. However, side effects and dynamics of
applications are becoming more visible. Again, these
may negatively impact the overall effect of AI sys-
tems and thereby reduce, annihilate, or even reverse
positive effects on the Common Good.
I will illustrate these with some examples from our
example domain.
First, by any version of “the drug problem” re-
lating to people and their behavior, inevitably many
personal data will be collected and processed. This
raises data protection issues that could well outweigh
any positive benefits. As an example, consider social
network mining, which is currently a popular method
also for studying drug usage, see for example [59]. In
the event of a data leak27, such social network mining
methods could be used to derive inferences about in-
dividuals’ drug-related behaviors or propensities that
may damage reputations and affect lives. Alterna-
tively, social-media users could receive targeted ad-
vertising based on their supposed propensities, and
vulnerabilities could be exploited. Importantly, the
question is not so much whether the mining meth-
ods return true knowledge, or whether the validity
of the targeted advertising can be demonstrated: the
attempt at manipulation itself may present the prob-
lem. This is a lesson learned from the history of the
Cambridge Analytica case, in which ideas from an
academic project in which social media were mined
to predict personality [60] were later supposedly used
for psychometrically micro-targeted election advertis-
ing [61].
Second, it is by now well-known that “objective”
big data analyses are likely to reproduce the biases
in the data they learn from (thus violating the right
to non-discrimination) [62]. This has been argued for
a wide range of big-data applications [63] and shown
with simulations for example for drug patrols [39]: A
predictive-policing application learns from past data
that arrests have occurred frequently in certain areas,
and it proposes that police patrol these areas prefer-
entially. This leads to more arrests in these areas,
which in turn feeds the learning to propose to patrol
them, etc. In general, since the deployment of big-
data analyses will itself create data that then become
input to further data analyses, this can easily create
vicious-cycle phenomena that have been observed by
sociologists for long, dynamics that can perpetuate
or even aggravate bias and discrimination [64]. A
promising research direction for breaking such feed-
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Engineering Dealing with social problems
problem solving approach
Goal function well-defined often involves unresolvable
ethical dilemmas,
continued re-negotiation
Method can be black box requires fairness, transparency,
accountability
Decomposition modular usually interdependent
Delegation can be fully delegated (at least some) participation required
Ethics codes and assessments canonical, starting points25, guidelines26
often a burdensome afterthought
Solvability Problems can be solved. Some problems can only be addressed.
Table 1: Solving engineering problems vs. dealing with social problems
back loops, drawing on reinforcement learning, pro-
poses a different strategy for patrolling that could
help to also detect the cases in the (initially) less
likely areas [65]. It will be interesting to see how
such strategies can be put into practice, and what
effects this will have.
Third, self-reinforcing feedback loops can occur not
only at the level of data, but also regarding technol-
ogy use. Problematic drug usage is a form of ad-
dictive behavior. But if someone decides to control
their drug use through an app, this can contribute
to addictive forms of Internet usage, and the ques-
tion arises whether this substitution is sensible. Vice
versa, learning to use an app ecosystem in a way that
is conducive to one’s well-being, could help overcome
substance abuse. It is an open question which factors
contribute to these dynamics playing out in vicious
or virtuous feedback loops.
4.6 How a Solutionism mindset may
hinder the asking of these ques-
tions
“Solutionism” is a term coined by Morozov [66]. One
of its definitions is “the belief that all difficulties have
benign (usually technological) solutions”. It can be
regarded as an outcome of the problem-solving mind-
set described above, but other issues described under
Q1-Q4 also play a role. In their article on lessons
learned from successful DSSG projects, Tanweer and
Fiore-Gartland stress the critical importance of ex-
pertise on context, project partner organizational cul-
ture, and multiple stakeholder perspectives. They
conclude that “exposing an inequity or proposing a
solution to a social problem doesn’t necessarily mean
that social good will follow. If we ignore that warn-
ing, we are in danger of lapsing into technological
solutionism (Morozov, 2013), where we propose data-
informed solutions that have little chance of actually
making a difference because they are contextually
misconstrued, organizationally untenable, or socially
unacceptable.” [17, p. 3]
Table 1 juxtaposes relevant aspects of engineering
and social-science mindsets. Solutionism, in this ta-
ble, is the assumption that a social problem (which
usually resides on the right-hand side) is a problem
on the left-hand side, coupled with the associated
treatment of this problem. The point is not to de-
clare the problem solving approach as useless for AI
striving for the Common Good – on the contrary, its
clarity and explicitness can often prove highly bene-
ficial for method and system development. Also, AI
researchers and practitioners increasingly work in in-
terdisciplinary teams, and sometimes also draw on
skilled decision analysts who are much more alert to
the complexities of decision making. However, the
temptation to consider problems “solved” by a tech-
nological “solution” remains strong, and it can stand
in the way of seeing and addressing the wider social
issues.
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5 Is the need to ask these ques-
tions not obvious? An explo-
ration of current publications
Some readers may concur that Q1-Q4 are important,
but ask: Is it not the case that all computer scien-
tists and AI researchers and practitioners know how
important problem formulation is? Is it not the case
that they are all aware of the central role of stake-
holders, and different stakeholders, in software re-
quirements engineering? Is it not the case that AI
researchers and practitioners know about limitations
of knowledge, and that computer scientists, coming
from a field that has its roots in cybernetics, are
aware of systems and their dynamics?
To get a first indication as to how AI in the inter-
est of the Common Good deals with these aspects,
I turned to four major venues for AI / DS for (So-
cial) Good. The reasons for this choice are the same
as for their choice as providing definitions, explained
in Section 2.3. In these conferences, a large number
of impressive methods and projects were described.
The following analysis in no way intends to downplay
these approaches’ positive contributions, and caveats
with regards to the study’s results (which may de-
rive from the conferences’ goal being “Social Good”
rather than “the Common Good”) will be described
in the discussion in Section 5.3.
5.1 Surveyed materials
I consulted all hyperlinked contributions (articles, ex-
tended abstracts, and presentations) that are made
available on the websites of the four venue’s most cur-
rent editions or in their published proceedings. This
procedure gave rise to 24 extended abstracts or arti-
cles from the Data Science for Social Good Confer-
ence 201728, 4 articles from SoGood 2017 [67], 15 arti-
cles from the 2017 AAAI Spring Symposium on AI for
Social Good [68], and 56 presentation slide sets, ex-
tended abstracts or articles from the 2nd AI for Good
Global Summit29. The selection contained all hyper-
linked contributions to the second, third and fourth
of these venues, since they all presented projects or
methods (introductory greetings and other organiza-
tional materials were not considered further). The
first venue, the Data Science for Social Good Con-
ference, had multiple tracks, of which three appeared
pertinent to the present questions and were there-
fore analyzed: DSSG Fellowship Project Talks, Short
Talks: Research Challenges in Doing Data Science
for Social Good and Short Talks: Collaboration Mod-
els for Social Good. All contributions were read and
assessed with regard to content and whether they
contained explicit information relating to the four
lead questions above.
5.2 Summary of the findings
5.2.1 Content
The contributions covered a wide range of issues, with
no specific issue covered by more than one article.
The motivation was usually framed as a problem to
be solved; in some cases, a general social-good goal
was named or could easily be inferred from the in-
troduction and the specific computational goal. The
issues were, in the large majority of cases, of a sub-
stantive nature. To the best of my knowledge, no
generally agreed-upon ontology of Social Good objec-
tives exists; I have therefore performed a rough clas-
sification by the SDG goals that were chosen as the
guiding principle of the AI for Good Global Summit,
and will report only the most frequent ones. I will in
some cases distinguish between contributions to the
first three venues and those to the fourth, for two rea-
sons: the Summit contributions were mostly slidesets
that presented little method detail (such that counts
of some methodological questions not being covered
may be misleading); and the Summit was structured
into four thematic tracks (such that counts of topics
in this conference follow from this structure, which is
not the case in the other conferences).
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) #3, Good
Health and Well-being, was the most frequent: Eight
out of the 43 contributions to the first 3 venues cov-
ered topics related to this SDG. The topic was also
covered in eleven of the contributions to the fourth
venue, in which AI + Health: Artificial Intelligence –
a game changer for Universal Health Coverage? was
one of the four tracks into which the conference was
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structured. Five contributions in venues 1-3 could
be linked to SDG #11, Sustainable Cities and Com-
munities, and two to transportation (which concerns
both cities and SDG #9, Industry, Innovation and
Infrastructure). In addition, a second track in the
AI for Global Good Summit with 13 contributions
focused on Smart Cities. The AI for Global Good
Summit dedicated a third track, with 6 contributions,
on AI and Satellite Imagery and linked this method-
centric topic specification for contributions to three
further SDGs (No Poverty, Life on Land, and Zero
Hunger), leading to a strong representation of these
topics.
Only a minority of the contributions focused on
procedural issues. Of these, five were concerned with
the scientific process as such, such as crowdsourcing
a health-related task to citizen scientists. These con-
tributions already start from the assumption that the
goal of the respective scientific project is a legitimate
goal for the social/common good (“the aim is not to
promote user interaction but to collect useful data
for their scientific goals” [69]). The fourth track of
the AI for Good Global Summit, Trust in AI, in its
descriptions and contributions likewise considers the
goodness of AI as a given and the need to build trust
as a way to convince people of this. Four contribu-
tions made proposals for the processes of working to-
wards the Social Good, ranging from DSSG projects
via non-profits to UN agencies tasked with identify-
ing SDGs in national development plans.
Three contributions dealt explicitly with demo-
cratic processes (in which citizens deliberate about
their visions on the Common Good): one presenting a
case study platform to create a democratic city plan-
ning system [70], one presenting a case study plat-
form to help make city growth equitable by increasing
transparency and accountability [71], one proposing
an agent-based architecture to predict the effects of
policies [72], and one presenting a mathematical vot-
ing model [73].
Another goal that could be linked to processes was
to improve information access/diffusion and quality
(five contributions): the proposed analysis methods
for summarizing news and social media contents and
identifying misinformation, can arguably help citi-
zens make better-informed democratic choices.
5.2.2 Q1: Alternative goals?
The vast majority of contributions worked with one
(sometimes vaguely described or even only implicit)
social goal and one computational goal. Thus, there
was in general no attempt at framing the social prob-
lem in different ways (see Q1 above), and no discus-
sion of whether and how the selected social goal could
translate into different computational goals. The dif-
ference between the two types of problems (Q1’) was
not the topic of any paper.
5.2.3 Q2: Different stakeholders, and a de-
scription of how their perspectives and
needs were assessed?
The large majority of contributions took their prob-
lem definition from the non-academic project part-
ner, which was usually also the data provider (for
example, a city council, a health agency, or a trans-
portation agency). In some cases, several partners
were mentioned (e.g., a tourism agency and a trans-
portation agency), but no conflicts of goals or prob-
lems were reported. Tanweer and Fiore-Gartland,
in their report on best practices, mentions stake-
holders repeatedly, differentiating between “partner
organizations” and “affected communities”: “DSSG
projects can be more effective when done with con-
sideration for the structures and cultures of partner
organizations. This knowledge is often tacit for those
stakeholders [. . . ] but without it, DSSG teams run
the risk of developing products and services that have
little chance of being embraced by stakeholders [. . . ]
DSSG teams need to view social issues from multi-
ple perspectives, realizing that different communities
and interest groups have [different and] sometimes
conflicting stakes in the way social problems are por-
trayed and addressed. Without understanding the
complex political landscapes and contested histories
within which social problems are enmeshed, they run
the risk of alienating affected communities” [17, p.
3].
Only one contribution described an explicit multi-
stakeholder process that was used to formulate the
computational/engineering problem [74], and an-
other one mentions that their project partners fol-
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lowed such a process, in which there are clearly visible
different positions [71]. An agent-based architecture
to reflect different positions and interests was pro-
posed in [72], but the question of how to elicit these
positions and interests was left implicit in this paper.
In two contributions, differences between stakehold-
ers’ interests are identified, but only one position is
then pursued in the method or tool [75], or the prob-
lem is delegated by proposing that the owner of the
AI device chooses the position that the machine will
follow [76]. Two contributions dealing with questions
of fairness take the existence of different viewpoints
of what “fair” means as the starting points of their
formal models [77, 78]. The contributions dealing
with democratic processes, especially [70], implicitly
acknowledge different viewpoints, but do not provide
any specifics.
5.2.4 Q3: The role of knowledge
It is difficult to describe the breadth and depth of
knowledge that was brought to the contributions,
since that would require an in-depth understanding
of all the domains of all the papers, or at least a vali-
dated bibliometric method. Both of these are beyond
the possibilities of the current article. However, it can
be observed that the setup of the venues strongly
encourages the participation by AI researchers and
practitioners, if only because the venues are defined
in a discipline-centric way (“AI for ...”, “Data Sci-
ence for ...”). This limits the incentives for people
from other fields to participate.
Concerning the role of knowledge as an output of
the contribution, the texts give clearer indications.
First, data science methods were not only the sub-
ject of the “Data Science for ...” venue, but also of
many contributions to the “AI for ...” venues (solely
or, for example, in combination with computer vision
in the AI and Satellite Imagery Track of the AI for
Good Global Summit). This leads to a strong rep-
resentation of knowledge-centric methods. Second,
nevertheless, eleven contributions are coupled with
an explicitly identified and specific intervention, such
as apps designed to detect health problems [79] or
apps to incentivize people to cycle to work [80]. A
further contribution mentions that the project part-
ner intends to use the developed tool for a number
of specified purposes [81]. Two contributions [82, 17]
describe collaboration processes and thereby go be-
yond knowledge. For several contributions in the AI
for Good Global Summit, it was difficult to see from
the slide-set presentation what roles knowledge and
interventions played. Thus, the numbers given here
are likely to be a lower bound on those contributions
that went beyond knowledge.
5.2.5 Q4: Dynamics
Auerbach et al. [71] interleave data analysis and pol-
icy intervention and build a tool to satisfy various
information needs in this process. They include a
discussion on how insights from their data analysis
and possible actions based on these insights could in-
teract in the future and what this would imply for
applicants and their use of the financing instrument
they study. In the studied sample of contributions,
this was the only one that included an explicit con-
sideration of possible dynamics.
5.3 Discussion
The results indicate that so far, the considerations
presented in the current paper are not an inte-
gral part of current operational research practices in
AI/DS for (Social) Good. On the other hand, the im-
portance of Q1 and Q2 is stressed in many method-
ological papers in the analyzed publications sample.
A question akin to Q3 is also highlighted from within
the DSSG community: the importance of broader,
and experiential, knowledge. Q4 is, at the moment,
mostly reflected in the fairness/non-discrimination
literature. On the other hand, the mutual depen-
dencies between technology and society are an inte-
gral part of the literature on socio-technical systems.
More interaction with this field could benefit future
AI and data studies [13]. So the community finds a
stronger reflection of process relevant, but also finds
it hard to translate these into concrete research prac-
tices.
Some caveats and encouraging recent developments
should be taken into account when interpreting these
findings.
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Q1 and Q2 were weakly represented. One reason
for this may be that the requirements on Q1 and Q2
are likely to be less stringent for Social Good than for
the Common Good. It appears from the definitions
put forward by this community (see Section 2.3) as
well as the conference survey (see Section 5.2) that
Social Good may well be produced by considering
only or mainly one, potentially very specific, stake-
holder group (such as poultry farmers in Africa [83]
or citizens registering as unemployed in one city [84]).
Developing AI for these groups and/or relevant use
cases involving them may still require researchers to
consider various perspectives and problem versions,
but the scope is much more limited than the “for
all” (members of a given community) of the Com-
mon Good. According to some definitions of the So-
cial Good, it also appears legitimate to outsource the
(social) problem definition to, for example, an NGO
or government agency.
The weak representation of Q1 and Q2 may also
be a consequence of research practices. When re-
searchers depend on the collaboration of a project
partner (for example, to have access to data or to
stakeholders), they may face difficulties if they con-
ceptualize the problem in a way that contradicts
the project partner’s notion. This expectation may
discourage them from exploring other conceptualiza-
tions of the problem.
Regarding the breadth of knowledge brought to
the research process (one aspect of Q3), a conference
not surveyed here made an interesting decision: the
“Fairness, Accountability and Transparency in Ma-
chine Learning” (FATML) workshop organizers de-
cided to host, as of 2018, a conference called FAT*
and to turn FATML into one sub-event. This de-
cision contributed to a more multidisciplinary per-
spective on fairness, accountability and transparency
than in the years before, with contributions drawing
on a more diverse set of stakeholders and problem for-
mulations. As a member of the Steering Committee
of FAT*, I am probably biased to see this conference
as a success, but the case shows that this widening
of scope is possible and can be highly successful in
terms of the number and quality of submissions and
attendance rates.
The method of the conference survey has limi-
tations. The coding exercise was, by design, ex-
ploratory, and the method simple. In future work, a
codebook and more coders will be employed. In ad-
dition, the results of the coding exercise also suggest
that the widespread absence of the considerations Q1-
Q4 in the publications may be (partially) an artifact
of publication conventions that favor unambiguity
and the appearance of a linear and smooth research
process. In addition, many of the surveyed docu-
ments were very short and therefore concentrated on
telling a simple story; a longer paper may have given
room to alternatives considered and other details of
the research process. As a result, I expect that quali-
tative interviews with project participants may yield
more information.
6 Conclusions: towards ethics
pen-testing
This section concludes the article by deriving recom-
mendations for design, and by discussing the scope
of the proposals made.
6.1 Recommendations and ethics pen-
testing
From the previous considerations, some recommen-
dations can be derived for AI researchers and practi-
tioners who want to contribute to the Common Good:
1. Study the various faces of knowledge and non-
knowledge, be wary of framing
2. Identify and involve stakeholders throughout
3. Keep looking for individual and common effects;
don’t forget the socio-political
4. Employ proportionality thinking: suitable &
necessary, balance of interests?
5. Focus on whole systems instead of parts (e.g.
algorithms)
6. Consider feedback loops and causal dynamics
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7. Draw on the state of the art: e.g. anonymiza-
tion, discrimination-aware methods
8. Ask questions, early and again
9. Be ready to be wrong, and embrace learning!
These recommendations follow from the discussions
of the four questions and their interlinkage, i.e. in
particular from Q3 (1. and 4.), Q1 and Q2 (2.), Q2
(3. and 4.) Q4 (5. and 6.), and the concept of provo-
cations as such (8. and 9.). I added 7. as a general
design principle learned from the discussions around
the GDPR, which, to protect the rights and freedoms
of individuals affected by (data processing) technol-
ogy, requires technology and organizational designers
to design based on the state of the art (see [85] for
a discussion of the challenge of translating this legal
requirement into engineering practice). This require-
ment appears pertinent and useful to all design “for
Good”.
But how can we ensure that these questions, which
are necessarily somewhat vague and “social-sciency”,
actually get asked, and their answers given attention?
For this, I propose to draw on an established tech-
nique from a core computer-science field, IT security.
This method can also be regarded as transposing hu-
manistic self-reflective and self-critical thinking into
computer-science mindsets. Specifically, the proposal
is inspired by pen-testing in IT security. A penetra-
tion test, colloquially known as a pen test, is an au-
thorized simulated attack on a computer system that
looks for security weaknesses, potentially gaining ac-
cess to the system’s features and data. It is well-
known that no system is 100% secure. The point is
not to pass all pen-tests (this is impossible), the point
is to get better through trying. Since IT security
researchers and professionals know this, pen-testing
is considered valuable and integral to development.
Analogous thinking is applied in other subfields of
computer science: cryptography and anonymization
(where attack modeling is key to any formal pro-
posal), and adversarial machine learning. I propose
to apply this mindset in AI design and call the result-
ing method ethics pen-testing. This consists of ask-
ing the lead questions described above with regard
to a proposed design, with the intention of “attack-
ing” the good intentions, the claim to a contribution
to the Common Good – as a critical and adversar-
ial method for identifying weaknesses not in order
to “fix” the design or make it unequivocally good
(because this is impossible), but in order to make
it better. Such ethics pen-testing should be carried
out not by the researcher/developer themselves, but
by others, including representatives of various stake-
holder groups. Drawing on techniques from various
disciplines, we have sketched the organization of such
“attacks” as “tool clinics” [86].
6.2 How specific is this article to AI,
and to the goal of the Common
Good?
This article was motivated both by the challenges for
AI and the specific current concern within AI about
the Good and the Common Good. The examples
and proposed countermeasures draw specifically on
AI, often DS, methods and applications. But is, or
in what sense(s) is it specific to AI?
As the discussions of data science and robot(ic)s
has shown, it is usually not straightforward to an-
alyze, let alone build a “purely AI” system. De-
ployed systems, and thus those with real-world eth-
ical implications, usually involve components from
many other fields of computer science, such as user
interfaces, network functionalities, or databases. The
question is then which of these components is “re-
sponsible” for real-world effects. For example, are
the often-discussed filter bubbles, fake news, and po-
tential manipulation problems a consequence of the
AI deployed in social media, or of the way online so-
cial networks are connected and information is spread
over the Internet? I have heard AI colleagues pro-
tective of the supposedly value-free nature of their
subfield blame the networking features, and network
researchers blame the AI. Conversely, positive effects
tend to be attributed to one’s “own” field. Any re-
searcher who uses the lens of socio-technical systems
studies would of course observe immediately that in-
deed these various components together constitute
the IT system that creates the effects, and they would
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point to the effects of the larger socio-technical sys-
tems in which the IT system is embedded.
For these reasons, neither the conceptual analysis
presented in this paper, nor the normative statements
derived from it, nor the intervention sketched as an
approach to operationalizing these statements, can
be limited to AI in a clean analytical way. In partic-
ular, the problem-solving mindset and the difficulties
of stakeholder involvement (lead questions 1 and 2)
are integral to computer scientists’ and other engi-
neers’ professional mindset and practice. To some
extent, all interventions share these problems; the
term “social engineering” emphasizes this common-
ality. I suspect that the reductionist tendencies in
conceptualizing problems and solutions are stronger
among computer-science engineers, but this presump-
tion should be investigated in future work.
Extending the same reasoning, one could apply the
“adversarial” method of ethics pen-testing also in a
much wider range of settings. For example, methods
for constructive technology assessment (CTA) [87] in-
volve multi-perspective criticism and (friendly) “at-
tacks”. The question how similar or dissimilar they
are to pen-testing should be the subject of future re-
search.
With regard to lead questions 3 and 4, AI is partic-
ularly implicated due to its special relationship with
knowledge (lead question 3) and on account of the
specific side effects and dynamics (lead question 4) of
big data, which is a key driver for AI.
In sum, the issues and recommendations of the
present paper are characteristic of, but not limited
to, artificial intelligence and data science.
Another question of scope concerns the ethical
goal: Are the questions and methods proposed here
specific to the Common Good? I believe that they are
applicable for other goals too, but the questions to
be asked will depend on the specific technology fields
and design goals. Thus, for example, design in the
interest of one specific right or value could also profit
from asking the questions and using the recommen-
dation checklist. But the scope may be smaller, and
conflicting viewpoints may not need to be considered,
or considered only as a background given, in system
design when the focus is on one or a small number of
stakeholder groups or goals. The interactive system
designed together with an anti-displacement NGO in
[71], already referred to in the conference survey, is a
good example of a specific focus in stakeholders, goal,
and background.
6.3 A road ahead
The idea of ethics pen-testing faces one key chal-
lenge: that the testers be perceived as “nagging”
and the tested researcher/developer feel attacked in
their personal good intentions. Both concerns have
been voiced towards me often in earlier presentations.
It needs to be kept in mind that in security pen-
testing, everybody agrees on what the core goal is
and when security is “broken”, whereas the reason
why one stakeholder considers a system “broken” in
ethics pen-testing may be a goal that the designer
does not even agree with (which implies that there
may be debates on whether the system is broken at
all). These challenges can only be overcome if re-
searchers and practitioners take the ethical quality of
their products as seriously as the formal and engi-
neering qualities, and if they regard this as a profes-
sional rather than personal virtue.
Finally, let us not forget that we need to attack the
choice of reflective questions and the idea of ethics
pen-testing itself too – theoretically and on the ba-
sis of case studies. This is an invitation to the AI
community to test and share their experiences!
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Notes
1https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
ethical. The term is often used, also in AI publications, in
this everyday meaning rather than in the scientific meaning
of relating to ethics.
2All URLs referenced in this article were last retrieved on
August 16, 2018.
3The term is also used in different disciplines. For example,
in economics, something is a common good if no-one can be
excluded from “consuming the good”, regardless of whether it
is a benefit or not. This concept relates to issues of access,
distribution and scarcity of resources. The discussion of these
issues would go beyond the scope of this article.
4https://dssg.uchicago.edu/. This description has been
used since the first version of the site recorded in the Web
Archive at https://web.archive.org/web/20140318063609/
http://www.dssg.uchicago.edu:80/
5from the first edition at https://sites.google.com/site/
ecmlpkdd2016sogood/
6https://www.aaai.org/Library/Symposia/Spring/ss17-
01.php
7https://aaai.org/Symposia/Spring/sss17symposia.php
8http://scf.usc.edu/~amulyaya/AISOC17/
9https://www.itu.int/go/AIforGood2018, https:
//sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300
10https://www.fatml.org/, http://fatconference.org/
11https://www.acm.org/publications/class-2012
12Cultural diversity was not mentioned explicitly in the
1948 UDHR, but is implicit in its Article 27 when inter-
preted together with the 2001 UNESCO Declaration on Cul-
tural Diversity, see http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
13Richard Nixon’s statement about drug abuse in a fa-
mous press conference 1971, see transcript at http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3047
14Donald Trump’s declaration of 2017, repeated in 2018,
see https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
president-donald-j-trump-combatting-opioid-crisis/.
15see transcript at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
combatting-opioid-crisis/
16Of course, it is a simplification to equate such framings
with actors; different interests, values, norms and positionings
further complicate the picture. Also, only digitizable formula-
tions of the problem were included, because others are outside
the scope of an AI approach. Number 7 illustrates the con-
textual nature of problem definition: This may be an addict’s
view when on withdrawal, even if the same person would under
other circumstance worry more about the negative effects on
health and life prospects.
17“3.4 Ensure that users and those who will be affected by
a system have their needs clearly articulated during the as-
sessment and design of requirements; later the system must be
validated to meet requirements.”
18cf. for example the sections on “Key guiding principles”
and on “Internet specific ethical questions”
19Section 2, Embedding Values Into Autonomous Intelligent
Systems
20All definitions of “problem” from https:
//en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/problem
21The distinction between data, information, and knowledge
is a classical discussion in AI, but since the focus here is on the
practical consequences of deployed AI technology rather than
on its philosophical foundations, the discussion is not relevant
for present purposes.
22This has not gone undisputed, see [88].
23Examples are described at https://www.addiction.
com/12575/six-sobriety-apps-you-should-know-about/ ,
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604085/treating-
addiction-with-an-app/, and https://saferlockrx.com/
top-apps-that-help-parents-prevent-teen-drug-abuse/
24cited after [89]
25“We must use critical thought to distinguish what is ethical
from what is lawful and to consider what it means to be a
professional. Therefore, we must continually question and re-
question authority, whether it is the law or a code of ethics,
or else we may be doomed to serve the interests of those who
crafted the code, not necessarily the interests of those who
need to embody the code or use it to guide their practice. Just
because a principle is codified does not make it ethical.” [90]
26“Multiple judgments are possible, and ambiguity and un-
certainty are part of the process. We advocate guidelines
rather than a code of practice so that ethical research can re-
main flexible, be responsive to diverse contexts, and be adapt-
able to continually changing technologies.” [29]
27Social network platforms and apps, and quantified-self
apps (see above), are often not very secure. Data and sys-
tem security, while key in the GDPR and also mentioned in
some AI ethics codes but not in others, does not receive as
much attention in AI as it probably should.
28https://dssg.uchicago.edu/data-science-for-
social-good-conference-2017/agenda/
29https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/AI/2018/Pages/
programme.aspx
